Since Gen Ne Win seized power in 1962, Burma has proudly proclaimed its
neutrality in international affairs. Under Snr-Gen Than Shwe, the country’s
“active and neutral” foreign policy remains in place, although many question
whether this accurately describes the way Burma now relates to the rest of the
world.
Than Shwe’s regime has long been a target of Western sanctions, which include
a visa ban that prohibits the paramount leader himself from traveling to the
West. Relations with neighboring countries are, however, more cordial. This has
produced a foreign policy that is more selective than neutral.
Last week, the general who routinely snubs visiting UN envoys welcomed
Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, who received Than Shwe’s special envoy,
Foreign Minister Nyan Win, in September 2007 amid the brutal crackdown on
monk-led protests.
State-run papers reported that Than Shwe briefed the Chinese minister on
Burma’s domestic situation, including the progress of reconstruction work in the
cyclone-hit Irrawaddy delta. More importantly, the general reported on the
country’s “democratic process and economic development, based on the principles
of independence and self-determination,” according to China’s Xinhua news agency.
The junta chief also reassured his visitor that Burma continued to value its paukphaw (fraternal) friendship with China.
Burmese leaders have traditionally used the term “paukphaw” to refer
to relations with China. This special relationship has, however, been subject to
numerous strains over the years. This was especially true in the 1960s and 70s,
when China aided the Communist Party of Burma (CPB).
Although the “big brothers” in Beijing dubbed Ne Win a “fascist,” the Burmese
strongman was pragmatic and visited China several times to repair ties. He held
high-level talks with Chinese leaders and maintained a good relationship. In
return, leaders from China also paid several state-level visits to Burma.
But as Ne Win dined with leaders in Beijing, Than Shwe and other mid-ranking
officers posted in the northern frontier region in the 1970s and 80s continued
the fight against Chinese-backed communists. They would never forget China’s
efforts to overthrow the government in Rangoon.
Today the CPB is gone, and its troops never did march down to Rangoon. China
has been the regime’s major ally since the military coup of September 1988,
supplying the regime with military and economic aid. Border trade between the
two countries has also expanded, to an estimated annual level of US $1.5
billion.
Now China is planning to build a gas pipeline in 2009, linking Sittwe on the
Arakanese coast with China’s landlocked province of Yunnan. China National
Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) will head the $2.5 billion pipeline project with a
50.9 percent stake, while Burma’s state-run Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise
(MOGE) will hold the rest.
Besides the MOGE’s stake in the project, Beijing will also be counting on the
regime to keep armed groups along the China-Burma border under control.
Although military leaders in Burma have expressed dissatisfaction with the
quality of some of the military hardware and jet fighters they have purchased
from China, they still appreciate Beijing’s unwavering support, including
exercising its veto at the UN Security Council.
However, it is important not to overestimate China’s influence over Burma.
China could also be looking for an alternative to Than Shwe, and like everyone
else, Chinese officials are looking at the post-Than Shwe era and beyond the
planned 2010 election.
Chinese know that the aid policy and economic cooperation over the past 20
years has not paid off much.
Chinese remain skeptical that the aid, economic cooperation and investment in
Burma will translate into meaningful economic development. It is obvious that
Burma is descending into a failed state. China is only helping to preserve the
regime.
It is unfortunate that China, which once sought to overthrow the Ne Win
regime, is now backing one of the most repressive regimes in the world. Than
Shwe often tells his generals that as long as he can count on three
countries—China, India and Russia—for backing, his regime will survive. Of these
three, China is obviously the most crucial.
Increasingly, however, the junta has been looking beyond China for new
friends, new markets and economic cooperation.
This month, Burma confirmed that it will open an embassy in Kuwait. Tomorrow
marks the tenth anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties between
Burma and Kuwait.
Kuwaiti Prime Minister Sheikh Nasser al-Mohammed al-Ahmed al-Jaber al-Sabah
visited Burma in August and signed an agreement on economic and technical
cooperation between the two countries.
During a meeting with the visiting prime minister, Than Shwe informed him of
his “road map” to “disciplined democracy” and explained the need for the army to
safeguard Burma’s unity and stability. Deputy Foreign Minister Maung Myint
visited Kuwait recently looking to expand Burma’s trade and business activities
there.
This is not the first time the regime has looked to the Middle East to expand
its diplomatic relationships. In 2006, Iran’s deputy minister for oil paid a
visit to Burma to express his country’s interest in cooperating with the
junta.
In April of last year, we also saw Burma formally restore its ties with North
Korea. Relations between the two countries had been severed for more than two
decades after North Korean state-sponsored terrorists launched a deadly bomb
attack on a high-ranking South Korean delegation of politicians who were
visiting Rangoon.
However, a clandestine diplomatic relationship had been restored as early as
the 1990s. In recent years, North Korean technicians have been seen in Rangoon
and in the newly built capital. Well-informed sources reported that North Korean
agents usually stay at state-owned guesthouses on the outskirts of Rangoon. The
lack of transparency surrounding the North Korean agents’ frequent visits to
Burma has fueled rumors about the nature of the cooperation between these two
“outposts of tyranny.”
But even as Than Shwe looks to broaden Burma’s diplomatic horizons, it is
clear that he remains very selective when choosing potential allies. In May,
Cyclone Nargis offered an opportunity to forge friendlier ties with the US and
the West, but Than Shwe opted to spurn their offers of assistance because they
came in warships.
The paramount leader doesn’t really count the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (Asean) as an ally, but maintains a normal relationship with the
regional grouping. His regime’s recent decision to send prominent dissidents to
jail demonstrated his disregard for the principles laid out in the Asean
charter.
With regard to Burma’s closest neighbor, Thailand, we have seen many ups and
downs in the relationship over the past two decades. Thaksin Shinawatra, the
billionaire Thai prime minister who was ousted in 2006, cultivated close
business ties to the Burmese junta. But even during the relatively amicable
period of Thaksin’s rule, Burma felt compelled to buy state-of-the-art MiG 29
jet fighters from Russia to counter the Thailand’s F16 jet fighters.
When looking for new friends, Than Shwe steers clear of countries that take
are likely to take issue with his regime’s human rights record. His treatment of
the democratic opposition and detention of Aung San Suu Kyi and 2,000 other
political prisoners are also taboo topics.
To return to Ne Win—the charismatic leader frequently visited Western
countries for medical treatment or annual vacations. Ne Win and the ministers
and generals who served under him acquired a taste for the finer things the West
had to offer, even if they had no appetite for Western democratic values.
Ne Win had bank accounts in Switzerland and liked to stay in London. He and
top leaders had TVs and video players long before Burma officially introduced
these marvels of technology in the late 1980s. Top leaders and their wives were
encouraged to go to hospitals in Europe when they needed to have check-ups—not
to Singapore, where Than Shwe regularly visits for medical examinations.
Ne Win and his senior ministers often visited Europe to get aid and loans.
The former Federal Republic Germany, or West Germany, was a favorite
destination. Germany’s Fritz Werner Company helped Burma to build an arms
industry as early as the 1950s to suppress ethnic insurgency.
Thanks to his “engagement” with the West, Ne Win even received military
assistance from the US to suppress narcotics in the 1970s. US-made helicopters
were also used to attack ethnic civilians and insurgents, but there was no
protest from Washington.
Under Ne Win, Burmese army officers were not only sent to Asian nations but
also to the US and UK for military education. Under former spy chief Gen Khin
Nyunt, dozens of army officers were CIA or UK-trained. Ne Win and Than Shwe all
benefited from this sort of engagement and cooperation from the West.
Until 2004, Burma’s feared secret police agency ran a ruthless and efficient
spy network inside and outside of the country. Ironically, this would not have
been possible without the contributions of countries that now regard Burma’s
current rulers as international pariahs.
Every time Than Shwe shakes hands with a visiting state leader or foreign
diplomat, critics of his regime shake their heads in dismay at the willingness
of many in the world to ignore his egregious crimes against the people of Burma.
Than Shwe’s occasional forays into international diplomacy may help him to stay
in power, but they will do nothing to improve the plight of Burma’s oppressed
people.
